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Halting the Revolution: Poland and the “Miracle at the Vistula”
Abstract
This paper is principally concerned with explaining the causes, course, and outcome of the Polish-Soviet
War of 1919-1921. It provides a background of the reasoning behind both camps’ geo-political
motivations leading up to the conflict. Although the background of the conflict is largely explored by this
paper, some basic understanding of the situation is assumed. The paper goes on to describe the major
events of the conflict and its results, with a strong emphasis on the Battle of Warsaw. Finally, the paper
provides a narrative as to how the conflict influenced the foreign policies of both nations during the
interwar era.
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In 1920, Eastern Europe was in a state of disarray. The three great powers
that had controlled and dominated Poland since the Third Partition in 1795 had
fallen. Imperial Russia officially collapsed in October 1917, though it had lost
control of Poland to the Germans over a year earlier. With the end of World War
One came the end of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. This left a
power vacuum of massive proportions. Despite French and British attempts at
diplomatic control and manipulation,1 Eastern Europe descended into a period of
warfare and haphazard nation-building. From this turbulent situation came two
new nations: Poland and the Soviet Union. The conflict between these two powers
was to have far reaching implications for not just the countries involved and the
surrounding area, but also the whole of Europe.
To understand the conflict between these two nascent powers, one must
understand the background of the situation. When German hegemony over
Eastern Europe ended, the Germans loosened their grip only grudgingly. Even
after the official armistice of November 11th, 1918, German troops continued to
have a presence in many of the countries that they had occupied during the war.
Finland and the Baltic states had active German paramilitary forces in them,
supporting anti-communist forces.2 In addition to conflicts in formerly controlled
areas, Germany faced a revolution brewing at home and withdrew as a
functioning power in Eastern Europe shortly after the end of World War One.3
Defeated, but not conquered, Russia was in an interesting position come
the end of World War One. Once the Bolsheviks attained a basic, de facto control
in what had been Imperial Russia, they moved to make peace with Germany.
Lenin did not want to inherit a losing international war; he wanted to secure his
own domain first and foremost. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Soviet
Union and Germany was signed in February 1918, before World War One ended,
and left Eastern Europe to the machinations of the Germans.4 Suppressing the
White movement at home was a higher priority for Lenin than fighting a
revolutionary war against the Central Powers. It is important to note that, despite
the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Lenin was never really an isolationist5 –
designs on a world revolution came with his idealist, revolutionary background.
The idea of permanent Marxist revolution dated to 1850 and was strongly
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supported by Trotsky.6 The fundamental Soviet position was that the revolution
was an inevitability of history and that all nations would come under its banner
eventually. The date when Lenin turned his eyes abroad, however, came sooner
than expected.
Onto this stage, the Soviets started to expand. Starting in late 1918, the
Soviets attempted to recapture territories formerly held by Imperial Russia in the
Baltic, the Caucasus, and the Ukraine.7 The westward prong of this wave of
Soviet expansionism was the result of two motivations. It is important to note that
the Soviets had not, at this time, stamped out the Whites. To some in Soviet
leadership, this push westwards was simply part of the Civil War, reclaiming
rightful territory. To others, it was part of an international game with the
intervention-oriented West.8 The two lines of Soviet thinking revolved around
somewhat competing narratives: one being the recapture of territory which was
previously controlled by the Russian Empire, the destruction of the White
Movement, and the strengthening of the economy.9 The other narrative
emphasized the importance of world revolution.
The position supporting world revolution was candidly articulated by
General Budyonny at the Second Comintern Congress -- which convened shortly
before the Battle of Warsaw. In a statement to the Congress, he said, “We will be
happy on the day when, together with the proletariat of the West, we will enter
into a decisive battle with the world bourgeoisie, when our army will receive its
operational orders from Red Paris, Berlin, or London.”10 During the early days of
the Soviet state, there was an influential belief that Marxist ideology should be
spread throughout the world and capitalism everywhere should be eradicated.
This was the doctrine of permanent revolution.11 The Soviets were hungry at the
notion of expansion. Further enticing the Soviets to act at this time was the fact
that Germany and Hungary experienced failed communist revolutions in the
aftermath of World War One.12 In the Soviet mindset, there were proletarians
willing and wanting to be liberated in Germany and Hungary. Thomas Fiddick
writes that Lenin was, “highly optimistic about the possibilities of exporting
revolution into Germany during the spring of 1920.”13 Marx did predict that the
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Revolution would come in an industrialized nation, after all.14 The only question
was how to link up with these revolutions. Poland stood in the way and for that, it
needed to be crushed. The tide of world revolution was to move on to an
ostensibly ripe Germany.
As the successor state to the Russian Empire, the Soviets felt, to some
degree, to have claim to the former territory of the Empire. This included Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Moldova. With the
exception of Finland, Soviet foreign policy towards these nations was directly
predatory at this time. From the creation of the Soviet Union to the collapse of it,
these nations were seen as part of an ironic imperial destiny. To the Soviets, it
was natural that these people and their territory be a part of the “motherland.”
Their right to national determination was not recognized as being legitimate.
Poland, being formerly part of the Russian Empire, was not immune to these
thoughts.
The Poles, however, wanted no part of these grandiose Soviet designs and
pronouncements of coming utopia. They saw national enemies, not class brothers
amongst the Soviets. The Poles, their foreign policy largely dictated by Chief of
State Pilsudski, wanted to create a buffer between themselves and Soviet power.
Germany and Russia, for the last 125 years, had occupied Poland and denied its
people their nationhood. As such, it is understandable that the primary concern of
Polish foreign policy would be to secure a strong defensive position, so as to
avoid any future Partitions. Pilsudski wanted to create a confederation of states in
Eastern Europe ranging from Finland to the Black Sea, with Poland leading. This
federation would serve as a buffer to the expansionist Soviets – defeated Germany
was less of a concern. Pilsudski, in effect, wanted to recreate the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. This coalition would be guided by Poland, but still be
a federal state.15 A key component of this plan was Ukraine. Western Ukraine had
a large number of ethnic Poles living in it and was historically part of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. Also, detaching the Ukraine from the Soviet Union
would deal the Soviets a heavy loss of population and territory – their
“breadbasket” would be cut out.
It was for these reasons that Polish forces advanced into independent
Ukraine in late 1918.16 The Ukrainian independence/nationalist movement was
standing in the way of Pilsudski’s grand rebirth of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth. Pilsudski and the Poles were more than willing to take their
chunk of western Ukraine by force. The war went well for Poland. Though the
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Poles did not occupy the whole of the Ukraine, they did take the western section
of it. The Soviets pounced on the eastern half of Ukraine along a similar
timeframe. By February 1919, the independence of Ukraine was over and war was
inevitable between the Soviets and Poles.
Polish forces initially achieved stunning success. When they advanced on
the Red Army in the summer of 1920, Soviet resistance was light. The Red Army
was still dealing with White forces in Crimea and had notable desertion
problems.17 The Red Army was pushed back beyond Kiev. In classic Russian
fashion, they traded space for time and allowed the invaders to become
overextended. Kiev was as far as the Polish invasion got. Nationalist fervor
increased18 and the Red Army managed to stabilize and reorganize itself. One
million A.W.O.L. soldiers returned,19 in addition to a large number of formerly
White officers.20 Because of this, the tide turned and the Poles were chased back
beyond the prewar borders.
Advancing rapidly, Soviet forces made straight for the Polish capital of
Warsaw. While a number of Soviet forces under Stalin were preoccupied with
taking Lviv,21 the main thrust of the Soviet counteroffensive centered on a twopronged pincer to the north and south of Warsaw. In this, Marshal Pilsudski saw
an opportunity. He attacked unexpectedly on the southern front with rejuvenated
forces. Nationalism and open Western support bolstered Polish morale. Around
Nasielsk, General Sikorski broke the back of the Soviet northern army; the
southern one was dispersed shortly after.22 Not even Marshal Budyonny’s
celebrated 1st Cavalry could stem the tide; it was defeated in the Battle of
Komarow.23 Soviet forces were in serious disarray after the battle, their
communication had broken down and they were routing. The Poles had won a
great victory. Considering how on-their-heels the Poles had been and how
complete a victory it was, the battle was christened the “Miracle at the Vistula.”
There are several reasons for the Polish victory. The Poles had excellent
cryptography, which allowed them to decode Soviet communications.24 This
information helped in Polish planning. Though the level of their contribution to
the Polish victory are disputed, French military advisors, along with other
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Western troops helped the Polish cause.25 Also contributing to the Polish victory
was simple nationalism. It was clear that if the Red Army took Warsaw, the entire
Polish state would be in jeopardy of being overrun. Pilsudski successfully
gathered his forces around the most patriotic narrative imaginable, the last stand
around one’s capital. The Red Army, by contrast, was extended beyond its normal
area of operations and did not enjoy the same kind of localized numerical
superiority that it had become accustomed to. Additionally, the Soviet
commanders Tukhachevsky and Budyonny did not cooperate or coordinate their
commands.26 A lack of mutual support between the Soviet forces hampered them
to a severe degree.
The Polish-Soviet War defined the borders and relationships between the
countries of Eastern Europe for a generation. The failure of the Soviets to spread
their revolution beyond the Russian-speaking world led to roughly twenty years
of tempered internationalism. Lenin began to focus his efforts on the New
Economic Policy. The Soviets were quiet, preferring to develop their economy
than to expand abroad. Victorious Poland, on the other hand, did not take all of
the territory that it could have during the negotiations for the Peace of Riga. For
Poland, the decision after the great victory of Warsaw to create a state out of
mostly ethnic lines was monumental. Though Pilsudski wanted to craft a unitary,
multicultural state, he was forced to temper his demands due to internal politics
and the reality that he could not afford to fight a prolonged war against the
Soviets. He did get a significantly larger area than what the Western Allies had
defined as being Polish initially following World War One, but not enough to
make his unitary state happen.27 Poland was not to develop a second PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. Poland allowed itself to become a small nation-state;
the Soviets spent the next twenty years in relative isolation. Had Poland taken
more territory from the Soviets, it may not have fallen to the Nazis in 1939; had
Poland fallen to the Soviets in 1920, the history of not only Europe, but the world,
would have been profoundly different.
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